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I. INTRODUCTION
The thought of allowing a critically ill or injured person perish,
while the people and equipment capable of saving his or her life
stand idle a few yards away, is unconscionable.' And yet, similar
scenes take place in our hospitals daily.
1. S 1730, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 13,903 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (Sen.
Durenberger stated that "the practice of rejecting indigent patients in life threatening situations for
economic reasons alone is unconscionable").
1
McHugh: Emergency Medical Care for Indigents: All Hospitals Must Provide
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
It has been estimated that 250,000 deserving people are denied
basic emergency medical care in the United States yearly. 2 One has
to ask how such a tragedy can happen in a country that has one
of the most advanced health care systems in the world. The simple
answer to the question is money. People are denied emergency care
because they can't pay for it or have no insurance.
Often, denial of emergency care does not come in the form of
an outright refusal. The more common and subtle methods of denial
include delay and inappropriate transfer. A transfer is inappropriate
when a hospital that is capable of providing the necessary care de-
clines to because of a patient's inability to pay.3 The horror stories
of "patient dumping" abound.4 When the human factors of these
stories are exposed it is difficult to comprehend how such an un-
civilized practice has been allowed to take place.
Historically, denial of care by inappropriate transfer has not been
sanctioned by the medical profession.5 Private hospitals, as well as
public hospitals, have a long tradition of charity and indigent care. 6
It is only the recent soaring costs that have caused some hospitals
to reexamine their priorities. 7 These increased costs were coinciden-
tally encountered with a reduction of state and federal funding. This
has only exacerbated the problem. 8 Another contributing factor is
that many private hospitals now view their role as that of a com-
petitive business.9 As with any competitive business, bad debts must
be minimized. One easy way to miiimize debt is to transfer indigent
2. Berliner, Patient Dumping No One Wins and We All Lose, 78 Am. J. Pun. HEmiTr 1279,
1279 (1988).
3. Zumpft, The Correction of Interhbspital "Dumping" By Legislation, 6 J. EMo33RENcY MED.
443, 444 (1988).
4. Usually, such dumping does not result in death, but occasions wheie it has are well doc-
umented in articles on the subject. For a graphic description of the problem, see Wrenn, No Insurance,
No Admission, 312 N. ENo. J. ME. 373 (1985). See also Schiff, Ansell, Schossen, Transfers to a
Public Hospital: A Prospective Study of 467 Patients, 314 N. ENO. J. MED. 552 (1986).
5. Beitsch, Economic Patient Dumping: Whose Life is it Anyway?, 10 J. LEoAL Mm. 433,
440 (1989).
6. Uzych, Patient Dumping, 77 J. FIA. MED. A. 97, 98 (1990).
7. See McClurg, Your Money or Your Life: Interpreting the Federal Act Against Patient
Dumping, 24 WAKE FoRnsT L. REv. 173, 180 (1989).
8. Lebow, Patient Transfers to a Public Hospital, 6 J. ElsmE¢RcY MBD. 447, 447 (1988).
9. McClurg, supra note 7, at 179.
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patients to public facilities. One public hospital that was the recipient
of a number of dumped patients incurred a ninety-two day deficit
of $320,000.00 in bad debts shifted to it by local private hospitals. 0
The experiences of that hospital are mirrored by other public hos-
pitals throughout the country."
It is tempting to rationalize that it is the job of public hospitals
to absorb this debt because public hospitals receive public funds.
This, however, should not be the critical issue of the problem. The
true losers in this fight are not the public hospitals but the indigents
who die or are permanently injured as a result of the process.
An economic transfer may save a private hospital some money,
but these transfers take time. It is this delay in treatment that may
cause irreversible harm.' 2 Often, the initial actions of a receiving
physician in stabilizing a true emergency patient are the most critical.
Because of their inability to pay, indigents have been forced to ac-
cept unequal treatment that is not only unfair but disproportionately
unsafe.
The Americans that are most likely to have to deal with this
problem are the uninsured. Often, the first question asked of an
emergency room patient is whether or not he or she has health in-
surance. It is estimated that there are 37 million people in this coun-
try who are uninsured13 and possibly up to 15 million who are
underinsured.' 4 Potentially, 20% of the. United States population is
affected. These people must live their lives with the knowledge that
when they are the most vulnerable, they may face the problem known
as "patient dumping."
The purpose of this article is to examine the current law con-
cerning the duty of all hospitals, private and public, to provide basic
10. Kellerman, Emergency Department Patient 'Dumping: An Analysis of Interhospital Trans-
fers to the Regional Medical Center at Memphis, Tennessee, 78 AM. J. PuB. HmuTH 1287, 1289
(1988).
11. See Lebow, supra note 8, at 447.
12. Uzych, supra note 6, at 98.
13. Berliner, supra note 2, at 1279. See also Medically Indigent Health Care Service Project:
A Report from the Legislative Task Force on Uncompensated Health Care and Medicaid Expenditures
(1988). This report by the West Virginia Legislature includes a discussion and illustration of the
demographics of the uninsured in West Virginia and the United States.
14. Berliner, supra note 2, at 1279.
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emergency treatment for all people regardless of economic resources.
There have been many recent changes that guarantee that this legal
duty does exist. This legal duty is a ripe basis for lawsuits if it is
breached. Physicians, hospitals, attorneys and, most of all, patients
can gain from a compilation of the current law on the subject.
This note will begin with a brief overview of the common law
history of the duty of hospitals to provide emergency care for in-
digents. The next section examines a recent federal law that imposes
a statutory duty on all hospitals which receive federal funds to pro-
vide stabilizing treatment for indigent emergency patients. 15 This sec-
tion includes an analysis of all federal case law which has interpreted
the statute. The final section focuses on the role of state law. An
attempt will be made to suggest how West Virginia should react to
the duty of all hospitals to provide basic emergency care for in-
digents. The laws of other states will be examined in an attempt to
discern some possible solutions to the problem of providing guar-
anteed emergency medical care for indigents. The more effective
alternatives may suggest potential approaches for future legislation
in West Virginia.
II. THE COmMON LAW
Until recently, the common law imposed no duty on private hos-
pitals to provide emergency care for people who were unable to
pay. 16 A primary example of this no-duty rule was Birmingham Bap-
tist Hospital v. Crews.17 That case involved a two-year-old child who
was refused treatment because she had diphtheria.'8 The court in
that case held that the hospital was a "private corporation, and not
a public institution, and owes no duty to accept any patient not
desired by it."'19 There are many examples of courts following this
basic no-duty rule.?°
15. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395dd (Law. Co-op. 1990).
16. Annotation, Liability of Hospital for Refusal to Admit or Treat Patient, 35 A.L.R.3d 841,
845 (1971).
17. 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934).
18. Id. at 399, 157 So. at 225.
19. Id.
20. See Costa v. Regents of University of California, 116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 460, 254 P.2d
[Vol. 93
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A sizeable minority of courts, however, managed to find reasons
to justify the recognition of a "common law duty to render emer-
gency treatment. ' 21 These courts have followed at least three dif-
ferent methods of arriving at the same conclusion.
The first theory set forth to support the minority rule was carved
out by a Delaware court using the concept of detrimental reliance.
Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove&2 was quickly recognized
as breaking from the previous rule concerning private hospitals' li-
ability. At the time it was decided, the case was seen as setting the
"modern trend of tort liability" 23 in the area. In Wilmington, an
infant was refused emergency care because she had previously been
under the care of another doctor who was not present. The court
held that if a patient relies to his detriment upon a "well-established
custom of the hospital to render aid in such a case," a duty to
render emergency care takes effect. u
The theory of detrimental reliance differed from the no-duty rule
only in the emergency room. Wilmington and courts that followed
it continued to recognize a no-duty rule in non- emergency situa-
tions. 2 Nevertheless, Wilmington was an important step because it
was the first case to recognize that a hospital may be liable if it
refuses to treat patients with emergency medical conditions.
Another theory in support of the minority rule arose when an
Alabama court created liability in the case of a hospital that acted
affirmatively to assume an obligation of care for a patient. 26 In
Schoulin, the emergency room orderlies placed the patient on a
stretcher and rolled him into the emergency room where he was
85, 95 (1953); Natale v. Sisters of Mercy, 243 Iowa 582, 52 N.W.2d 701 (1952); Hill v. Ohio County,
468 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Ky. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1041 (1972); Levin v. Sinai Hospital of
Baltimore, 186 Md. 174, 180, 46 A.2d 298, 301 (1946); Van Campen v. Olean General Hospital, 210
App. Div. 204, 209, 205 N.Y.S. 554, 558, aff'd, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1924).
21. McClurg, supra note 7, at 183 (to support his conclusion, the author cites cases from the
14 states that have recognized this common law duty).
22. 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961).
23. Comment, Torts-Private Hospitals-Liability for Refusal to Provide Emergency Treatment,
64 W. VA. L. Rav. 234, 236 (1961-62).
24. Wilmington, 54 Del. at 25, 174 A.2d at 140.
25. E.g., Stanturf v. Sipes, 206 N.W.2d 198 (Wis. 1973).
26. Citizens Hospital Association v. Schoulin, 48 Ala. App. 101, 262 So. 2d 303 (1972).
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examined by a nurse. After examining him and finding out that he
lacked insurance, the nurse refused to admit him. Later, the patient
was admitted to another hospital where he was diagnosed as having
a broken back. The court held that the affirmative action of the
nurse created liability. This case may be distinguished from Wil-
mington and its progeny because in this case, the hospital was held
liable because its employees took affirmative action to care for the
patient by placing him on the stretcher. In Wilmington, no such
affirmative action was present. In both cases, though, the result was
the same. The courts recognized a duty by hospitals with emergency
rooms to supply the services to those who were in need. The Wil-
mington court relied on the theory of detrimental reliance, while the
Schoulin court relied on a theory of affirmative action by the em-
ployees.
A third theory which has been raised to justify a duty to treat
emergency room patients Was taken by two state courts in the early
1970's.2 A Wisconsin court affirmed a common law duty for private
hospitals to provide such care in Mercy Medical Center of Oshkosh
v. Winnebago County.29 The court based its opinion squarely on
public policy. In that case, a private hospital was seeking to recover
funds for emergency services it had rendered to an indigent woman.
The court granted the request and noted that "[I]t would shock the
public conscience if a person in need of medical emergency aid would
be turned down at the door of a hospital having emergency service
because that person could not at that moment assure payment for
the service." 30 Other courts were reluctant to follow a public policy
argument.3' One other court, however, followed this precedent in
1975. An Arizona court recognized the argument of public policy
in Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hospital.32 In that case, two Mexican
children who had been badly burned were denied care by a private
27. Id. at 107, 262 So. 2d at 300.
28. Beitsch, supra note 5, at 460.
29. 206 N.W.2d 198 (Wis. 1973).
30. Id. at 201.
31. E.g., Campbell v. Mincey, 413 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd mem., 542 F.2d 573
(5th Cir. 1976).
32. 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975).
[Vol. 93
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hospital. Citing state statutes which required all hospitals to maintain
emergency rooms, the court held that public policy required hospitals
to treat all individuals that present themselves.33
One recognizable problem with the common law is that there
was no consistency from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The duty to
treat was the exception rather than the rule. Relief was only granted
in the case of misfeasance, and misfeasance can only be shown where
there is a recognized duty that is breached. Since most courts were
unwilling to recognize a duty to treat, there was normally no ac-
tionable tort for a hospital's failure to provide its gratuitous services.
Misfeasance could only exist, therefore, when there was a contrac-
tual agreement between hospital and patient, or when the court chose
to follow the exceptions mentioned above.
There was also no common definition of what constituted emer-
gency or how much treatment a hospital was required to render
before it released a patient. There was no way to determine at what
point in the treatment of a patient a hospital had fulfilled its duty
to provide emergency care. 34 Many states recognized these problems
and attempted to remedy them.35 Such attempts met with varying
success.
In response to the confusion created by the growing problem of
patient dumping and the lack of a consensus on how to deal with
the problem, a number of United States senators drafted a law to
deal with the problem. 36 This law was studied by Congress, 37 and
was overwhelmingly accepted and passed as an obscure amendment
which was attached to the huge Comprehensive Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985.38 This legislation has brought
much needed attention to patient dumping at a time when the prac-
33. Id. at 106, 537 P.2d at 1330.
34. Beitsch, supra note 5, at 461.
35. See infra note 139 and accompanying text. To date, 21 states have passed laws which
recognize and attempt to regulate the problem. The content of these laws varies widely.
36. See supra note 1.
37. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 241(I), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CoNo. & Arn.N. NEws 606.
38. Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 99-272, Title IX, § 9121(b),
100 Stat. 164 (1985) [hereinafter COBRA] (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395dd (Law. Co-
op. 1990)).
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tice has been growing at an alarming rate. The legislation also cre-
ated a statutory duty of care which abandons the common law rules.39
The abolishment of the common law rules by the federal statute has
greatly contributed to the possibility of controlling patient dumping.
III. A FEDERAL STATUTORY DuTY To PROVIDE EMERGENCY
CA: COBRA
A. Overview of the Act
The anti-dumping amendment to COBRA is entitled "Exami-
nation and Treatment for Emergency Medical Conditions and Women
in Active Labor." 4 The commonly accepted name for the statute
is COBRA, obviously named after the huge Act to which it was
attached. The official title of COBRA does not do justice to its true
purpose or impact. The purpose of the Act is to prevent "patient
dumping. ' 41 The Act is intended to accomplish this goal by pro-
viding a set of guidelines which hospitals must follow with respect
to emergency patients. The Act also sets standards that must be met
before an individual can be transferred.
COBRA applies to all hospitals with emergency room facilities.4 2
The law has subsequently been amended on four occasions. As a
result of an amendment to the law in 1989, when an emergency
patient presents himself, the hospital must utilize all "ancillary serv-
ices routinely available to the emergency department" in treating
that patient. 43 The requirements of the Act are complex, but what
the Act basically mandates is that all individuals who present them-
selves to the emergency room are required to be given an appropriate
medical screening examination to determine if an emergency medical
condition exists. 44 If it is determined that an emergency medical con-
dition does exist, the hospital must provide stabilizing treatment. 45
39. Fine, Opening the Closed Doors: The Duty of Hospitals to Treat Emergency Patients, 24
WASH. U.J. URB. & CorE1,mp. L. 123, 125 (1983).
40. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395dd (Law. Co-op. 1990).
41. See supra note 1.
42. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395dd(a) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A).
[Vol. 93
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In order to properly stabilize, a patient, the physician must provide
treatment necessary to assure that the patient will not deteriorate in
transit to a receiving hospital.46 It is only after this initial treatment
that a hospital may consider transferring a patient to a public hos-
pital.
Of course, the hospital will not be held liable if the patient re-
fuses treatment or if the patient consents to a transfer prior to sta-
bilization. As a result of the most recent amendment, the hospital
is required to inform the individual of all the risks of a transfer
and obtain written consent of this refusal of treatment.47
The only exceptions that allow a hospital to transfer an unsta-
bilized patient include: a written, informed request for transfer by
the individual (or a legally responsible person); and certification
signed by a physician that the medical benefits of the transfer out-
weigh the risks to the individual or unborn child.4 An amendment
of 1989 also made it mandatory that an individual authorizing the
transfer must be a physician, even if a physician is not present in
the emergency room.4 9
In order to effect an appropriate transfer, the transferring hos-
pital must first provide stabilizing treatment "within its capacity
which minimizes the risks to the individual's health and .... the
health of the unborn child. ' 50 The transferring hospital must also
obtain an agreement by the receiving facility to accept the transfer,
and the receiving facility must be qualified to accept the individual. 51
The transferring hospital must send with the patient all records
of the individual, including the diagnosis, observations and treat-
ment provided by the transferring hospital.5 2 The records package
must also contain any copies of written informed consent documents
46. Id. § 1395dd(e)(3).
47. Pub. L. 101-239, Title Vi §§ 6211(b)(1)(A)-(C), Dec. 19, 1989, 103 Stat. 2245, (codified
at 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395dd(b)(2) (Law. Co- op. 1990)).
48. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii).
49. Id. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(iii).
50. Id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(A).
51. Id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(B).
52. Id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(C).
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and the names of any on-call physicians who refused to respond to
the emergency while the patient was at the transferring hospital. 3
The Act has stiff enforcement mechanisms. If the Act is violated,
there are two options of enforcement: government enforcement and
individual civil suits. The government enforcement is handled by the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). If the HCFA de-
cides to pursue a claim against a hospital, it may either terminate
or suspend the hospital's Medicare provider agreement, making the
hospital ineligible to receive Medicare or Medicaid payments, or im-
pose a civil monetary penalty of up to $50,000 on the hospital, or
both. With regard to a physician, the HCFA may either deny that
physician participation in any Medicare provider agreements and
state health care programs or impose a fine of up to $50,000, or
both.m
Medicare provider agreements may be terminated if a hospital
or physician violates the provisions of the law either knowingly or
negligently. 55 Monetary penalties, on the other hand, may only be
imposed if a hospital or physician violates the provisions know-
ingly.56
The examining physician or an on-call physician may be held
liable. The examining physician is responsible if he authorizes a
transfer when he knew or should have known that the benefits of
such transfer did not outweigh the risks, or if he knowingly mis-
represents an individual's condition. 57 The on-cal physician is liable
if, after being notified by the examining physician, he refuses to
appear or refuses to appear within a reasonable period of time.58
The second enforcement provision is the right of any individual
"who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating
hospital's violation ... [to] obtain those damages available for per-
sonal injury under the law of the State in which the hospital is
53. Id.
54. Id. § 1395dd(d).
55. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1).
56. Id. §§ 1395dd(d)(2)(A), (B).
57. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(B).
58. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(C).
[Vol. 93
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located." 9 A hospital that receives a patient in violation of the Act
may also sue for its financial loss in treating the individual wrong-
fully transferred. 6°
The statute of limitations for any suit under the Act is set at
two years from the time of the violation. 61 This statute of limitations
likely applies in state as -well as federal courts that entertain suits
under the Act.62
The Act defines the terms which are critical to its enforcement.
"Emergency medical condition" is defined as:
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity
(including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could
reasonably be expected to result in-
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman,
the health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy, or
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious disfunction of any bodily organs or part; or
(B) with respect to a pregnant woman who is having contractions-
(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another hospital
before delivery, or
(ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the woman or
the unborn child. 6'
The language and definitions of COBRA seemed clear when it was
passed. In reality, though, COBRA had little effect until the ju-
diciary began interpreting its provisions, thereby giving them con-
crete meaning. The next section will look at how various courts have
interpreted the language of COBRA.
B. Federal Courts Interpret COBRA
Hospitals, physicians and patients initially had many questions
about the impact of COBRA. Some questions have been answered,
59. Id. § 1395dd(d)(3)(A).
60. Id. § 1395dd(d)(3)(B).
61. Id. § 1395dd(d)(3)(C).
62. See infra notes 78-88 and accompanying text (note particularly the decision affecting state
procedural limitations).
63. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395dd(e)(1).
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but many still have not. This section analyzes portions of the thirteen
cases wherein federal courts have written opinions clarifying certain
issues under the Act. These cases form a cumulative compilation
of all opinions which have been rendered on COBRA. To date, no
complaints have been made in any state courts alleging a violation
of COBRA. Obviously, the federal cases have only persuasive au-
thority to courts outside their jurisdiction; nevertheless, they are
informative, and in the relatively new COBRA cases the federal
courts frequently cite persuasive authority from other jurisdictions.
1. Jurisdiction
The first and most pressing issue to be decided was what courts
had subject matter jurisdiction over suits brought under the Act. It
was decided early that any appeal by a hospital or physician con-
cerned with penalties imposed by the HCFA would be resolved by
an Administrative Law Judge of the Federal Department of Health
and Human Services. 6s Generally, therefore, the problem of juris-
diction only applies to suits by individuals under the. civil enforce-
ment section of the Act.
The first federal case to clarify any of the issues of the Act was
Bryant v. Riddle Memorial Hospital.6 In that case, the Pennsylvania
64. The cumulative list of federal cases interpreting section 1395dd includes: Thornton v. South.
west Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990); Wilson v. Atlanticare Medical Center, 868 F.2d
34 (Ist Cir. 1989); Owens v. Nacogdoches County Hosp., No. L-87-97-CA (E.D. Tex. June 26, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file); DeBerry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, No. 90-C-1173 (N.D. Ill. E.D.
June 15, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. file); Sorrells v. Babcock, 733 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D.
IlL. 1990); Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433 (D. Kan. 1990); Evitt v. University Heights Hosp.,
727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Verhagen v. Olarte, No. 89 Civ. 300 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file); Thompson v. St. Anne's Hosp., 716 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ill. 1989);
Nichols v. Estabrook, No. 87-430-D (D.N.H. June 21, 1989) (WESTLAW, DCT database); Reid v.
Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hosp., 709 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Maziarka v. St. Elizabeth
Hosp., No. 88-C-6658 (N.D. IMl. Feb. 15, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. file); Bryant v. Riddle,
689 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
65. The first case addressing this issue is Inspector General v. Burdett, No. C-42, Department
of Health and Human Services, Department Appeals Board (July 28, 1989). At present, the HHS
has a "punish now, appeal later" approach to fines and suspensions. This has raised a due process
question that has not been answered. For a detailed analysis of the frustrations experienced by Dr.
Burditt in his fight against the HHS, see Jones, The Devil or the Sea? Transfer Regulations Create
a Dilemma, 85 Tax. Mm. 70 (1989). For a discussion of HHS enforcement, see infra notes 129-138
and accompanying text.
66. 699 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 12
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district court confronted the issue of jurisdiction head-on. The plain-
tiff in that case was a nursing home patient who was taken to a
hospital for a separated shoulder.67 She was released within 24 hours.
The plaintiff filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1395dd in federal court
alleging that she was released before her condition had stabilized. 68
The hospital moved to dismiss on the ground that the Act does not
provide a basis for federal jurisdiction. 69 The court rejected that
theory and held that the Act does provide a basis for federal ju-
risdiction because disputes under it are founded on a federal ques-
tion.70 In order to reach this conclusion, the court examined the
legislative history of COBRA. In doing so, the court determined
that the language of the Judiciary Committee hearing was clear. A
member of the committee stated that an aggrieved party may "bring
an action in federal or state court.1 71 The court concluded its anal-
ysis by holding that the clear intent of Congress was to "provide
a federal cause of 'action and to instruct State and federal courts
to apply state law when determining damages." 72 It is obvious from
this holding that the Bryant court has adopted concurrent subject
matter jurisdiction; thus, a suit brought in state or federal court is
likely to be within the jurisdiction of that court.
2. Who May Be Sued?
Section 1395dd(a)(d)(A) allows an individual harmed as a result
of a violation of COBRA to maintain a private cause of action.7 3
There is disagreement as to whether this provision is applicable only
to hospitals, or both hospitals and physicians. The text of the statute
only mentions hospitals, 74 but an Illinois district court has ruled that
physicians may be sued under this provision.75 Of the thirteen federal
cases pursued under 1395dd(a)(d)(A), three have included physicians
67. Id. at 491.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 493.
72. Id.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(3)(A).
74. Id.
75. Sorrels v. Babcock, 773 F. Supp. 1189, 1194 (N.D. IIl. 1990).
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as defendants. 76 Only one of the three was dismissed, and it was
dismissed on other grounds.
A New York district court, on the other hand, stated that phy-
sicians may not be sued under the statute77 because the plain lan-
guage of the statute says that only hospitals may be sued. A majority
of suits under this provision have supported this conclusion and have
only included the hospital as a defendant. It is likely that when the
circuit courts are asked to resolve this discrepancy, they will follow
the plain meaning of the statute and the majority of the district
courts.
3. Conflict of Laws
One problem encountered by the federal courts has been the
question of how state law should be applied to the federal cause of
action. This question was addressed superficially in Reid v. Indi-
anapolis Osteopathic Hospital.78 In that case, a patient who had been
involved in a serious accident was examined and treated, but soon
thereafter transferred to another hospital. After being admitted to
the other hospital, she died.79 The decedent's administrator brought
an action under COBRA alleging that his wife had not received the
proper stabilizing treatment by the first hospital prior to transfer.
The defendant moved to dismiss because the plaintiff failed to com-
ply with the procedures required by state law before bringing an
action for medical malpractice. 80
Medical malpractice regulation has traditionally been left to the
states to implement. The procedural methods of bringing a medical
malpractice suit differ between states. Some states require a peer
review prior to a suit,81 while others do not. The crucial question
76. See id.; Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433 (D. Kan. 1990); Nichols v. Estabrook, No.
87-430-D (D. N.H. June 21, 1989) (WESTLAW, DCT database).
77. Verhagen v. Olarte, No. 89 Civ. 300 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed Library,
Dist file).
78. 709 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 854.
81. E.g., IN. CODE § 16-9.5-9-2 (1990); MASS. Gm. L. ch. 231, § 60B (Mass. Law. Co-op.
1985 & Supp. 1990).
[Vol. 93
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/5
MEDICAL CARE FOR INDIGENTS
to be decided was whether these limitations applied to federal law.
The court in Reid looked to the legislative history of COBRA
to determine how to properly apply the state medical malpractice
law.8 2 In that case, the applicable law was the law of the state of
Indiana. As the court noted:
[1]n Indiana, medical malpractice actions are statutorily limited in two different
ways: they are limited procedurally, see IND. CODE 16-9.5-9-2 (stating that '[n]o
action against a health care provider may be commenced in any court of this
state before the claimant's proposed complaint has been presented to a medical
review panel established pursuant to this chapter and an opinion rendered by the
panel'), and they are limited [substantively] in the amount of damages they may
seek. 3
Based on the legislative history, the court decided that Congress did
not intend for the procedural limitations of the state medical mal-
practice laws to apply to the federal cause of action.84 The court
also reasoned that the preemption clause of the Act directly disallows
the application of state procedural limitations.8 5 In contrast to state
procedural limitations which do not apply, the court ruled that sub-
stantive state laws on limits of recovery do apply. 6 The court also
opined that Congress was "aware of the growing concern in some
states that excessive damage awards were fueling a medical mal-
practice 'crisis."'87 Based on this awareness, the court decided that
Congress intended that the substantive limitations will apply. 8
In Wilson v. Atlanticare Med. Center, the First Circuit also briefly
discussed the issue of state procedural limitations.8 9 In that case, the
administratrix of a nursing home patient brought suit under the Act
against a hospital for returning the decedent to her nursing home
prematurely, resulting in her death.90 While the court never held
explicitly that state procedural limitations should apply, it did note
82. Reid, 709 F. Supp. at 855.
83. Id. at 854.
84. Id. at 855.
85. Id. (citing to 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f)).
86. Reid, 709 F. Supp. at 855.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 868 F.2d 34, 35 (1st Cir. 1989).
90. Id.
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that "[d]octors and hospitals ... need screening protection against
frivolous claims as much under the federal statute [COBRA] as they
do for other malpractice charges." 91 This language is strongly sug-
gestive that the court would apply state procedural limits in COBRA
cases.
Arguably, the issue is unresolved because of this apparent con-
flict. It is likely, however, that the position of the court in Reid
will be more persuasive because it was a holding by the court, while
the statements of the Wilson court were dicta. The final resolution
of the issue will require the deciding court to look at the preemption
clause of the statute. If the court is persuaded, as the Reid court
was, that the preemption clause prohibits an application of state
procedural law, then a federal cause of action under COBRA will
not necessitate any compliance with state medical malpractice law.
A final important issue addressed by the court in Reid dealt with
whether medical malpractice damage caps were the appropriate lim-
itation of recovery or simply damages under state law for personal
injury. The statute specifically states that any individual "may...
obtain those damages available for personal injury under the law
of the state in which the hospital is located." 92 The plaintiff in Reid
argued that medical malpractice limits do not apply because the
statute specifically says "personal injury." 93 The court rejected this
notion on the grounds that such an argument would "render the
statute's incorporation clause effectively meaningless." 94 In addition,
the court reasoned that most medical malpractice damage caps are
simply personal injury claims against a health care provider, as is
a claim under the federal antidumping act. 95
4. Strict Liability or Negligence
A collateral issue of Reid that was only mentioned briefly, but
is likely to cause many questions, is whether an action under the
91. Id. at 35.
92. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395dd(d)(3)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
93. Reid, 709 F. Supp. at 855.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 856.
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Act is based on traditional negligence or strict liability. This question
is significant because if strict liability is applicable, fault need not
be proven. At one point in Reid, in relation to the state procedural
requirement for a medical malpractice review panel, the court noted
that "the panel's opinion [on negligence] ... could 'directly con-
flict' with the strict liability standards of the federal statute - fur-
ther justifying preemption." 96 Although this comment was dicta, it
offers an argument that courts may apply strict liability. Further
evidence of this is the language of the statute itself, which requires
only proof of violation, causation and damages. 97
The problem with applying the strict liability standard is that
hospitals and physicians may be penalized even if they are able to
satisfy the objective negligence test. Later cases have avoided using
any references to strict liability and have taken the more reasonable
approach that a "violation of a statutory standard of conduct can
constitute negligence and may give rise to liability in tort." 98 Such
an approach will allow a detailed inquiry into whether a patient was
properly stabilized in accordance with the requirements of COBRA.
5. Punitive Damages
The question of punitive damages was addressed in the case of
Maziarka v. St. Elizabeth Hospital." In that case, an uninsured,
elderly man was given emergency treatment by the defendant, but
this treatment was discontinued when it was found out that the
plaintiff had no insurance. In addition to actual damages and an
injunction, the plaintiff sought punitive damages. The court held
that actual damages and an injunction were recoverable, but punitive
damages were not because the state where the case was heard did
not allow punitive damages in medical malpractice cases.' °° This rul-
ing is important because it provides a strong tool to limit damages
96. Id. at 855.
97. McClurg, supra note 7, at 207. The article by McClurg examines the relationship of strict
liability to section 1395dd. The author provides some convincing arguments that the traditional neg-
ligence standard should be retained for actions under section 1395dd.
98. Nichols v. Estabrook, No. 87-430-D (D. N.H. 1989) (WESTLAW, DCT database).
99. No. 88-C-6658 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file).
100. Id.
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for a hospital operating in a state which disallows punitive damages
for medical malpractice. On the other hand, a patient in a state
allowing punitive damages will have a strong argument that those
type of damages may be recovered.
6. Determining When a Violation Has Occurred
A recurring basis for dispute over the Act involves the problem
of determining when a violation occurs. The language of COBRA
states that a violation takes place when an unstabilized patient is
transferred inappropriately. For this violation to occur, the hospital
or attending physician must take some action. What about the hos-
pital or physician that fails to act or to even examine a patient?
Can this hospital or physician be liable under COBRA? An Illinois
district court ruled that denial in treating an indigent may equal a
violation of the Act. 101 The decision is based on the legislative history
of COBRA and statutory requirement under the Act to provide sta-
bilizing treatment. 02 It has not been determined in any court what
happens when a hospital delays treatment for a patient. All that is
clear is that any delay that an indigent may be exposed to should
be minimized by treating and processing an indigent patient in the
same manner as an insured patient. This seems to be the only sure
way for a hospital to avoid liability for delaying treatment.
7. Possible Limitations of COBRA
Many recent cases have made it clear that COBRA may not be
the panacea to all emergency room patients who encounter problems.
Some courts have demonstrated a willingness to limit the reach of
the Act in providing the federal cause of action. The first case to
rule against an emergency room patient who had brought an action
under COBRA was Evitt v. University Heights Hosp.10 In that case,
a patient was treated and released from the emergency room after
101. Thompson v. St. Anne's Hosp., 716 F. Supp. 8, 9 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
102. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395dd(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
103. 727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
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experiencing chest pains. She was directed to see her own doctor in
the morning. The plaintiff later suffered a heart attack.1 °4
The plaintiff claimed that the hospital failed to provide her with
an appropriate screening exam in violation of the provisions of CO-
BRA. The court never resolved the issue because the plaintiff could
not show that she was dismissed for economic reasons.105 The court
held that "[c]laims regarding diagnosis and treatment lie in the area
of medical malpractice, an area traditionally regulated by state
law."' ° The obvious lesson of this case is that COBRA only applies
if an individual is denied treatment for economic reasons. Congress
enacted the law to guarantee indigent access to emergency care.
The opinion of the court in Evitt was reaffirmed with additional
clarity in Stewart v. Myrick.107 That case also involved a patient who
came to the emergency room for chest pains. Tragically, the patient
died before he could return to the hospital after his release. The
patient's widow sued the hospital and the attending physician. 108 The
defendant hospital moved for summary judgment on the ground that
the plaintiff's expert witness agreed that the hospital was not neg-
ligent. The court, however, ignored this argument and granted the
motion because both parties agreed that the plaintiff had not been
turned away for economic reasons.'09
In an effort to avoid summary judgment from the agreed fact
that he was not refused treatment due to an inability to pay, the
plaintiff argued that the defendants only violated one portion of the
Act, namely, the section that requires a screening examination and
treatment of emergency medical conditions.110 The court flatly re-
jected this notion and held that the Act was designed to protect
indigents. The court further stated that the case at hand "represents
104. Id. at 496.
105. Id. at 498.
106. Id. at 497. See also Nichols v. Estabrook, No. 87-430-D (D.N.H. 1989) (WESTLAW, DCT
database) (dismissing the plaintiff's claim because it was not based on a denial of services for economic
reasons).
107. 731 F. Supp. 433 (D. Kan. 1990).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 434.
110. See id. (the plaintiff was alleging violation of § 1395dd(a) and § 1395dd(b)(1)).
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a traditional claim for medical malpractice."'' It is clear from these
cases that a transfer based on economic reasons is a necessary pre-
requisite to any claim under the Act. For those who feel that they
received a misdiagnosis or were turned away for different reasons,
their remedy is a suit for medical malpractice under the laws of the
appropriate state.
One very recent decision disagrees with the limitations placed on
COBRA by Evitt and Stewart. In DeBerry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n,"2
the court rejected the notion that COBRA is designed only to protect
indigents.113 In that case, the plaintiff's daughter was treated and
released for noneconomic reasons. Later, the patient was readmitted
and diagnosed as suffering from spinal meningitis. The plaintiff did
not allege that she was turned away for economic reasons. The court
specifically mentioned the holdings of Evitt and Stewart when it held
that the language of COBRA does not include the limitation that
the patient must be dumped for economic reasons in order to be
protected by the statute." 4 The court accused the courts in Evitt and
Stewart of attempting "to undercut the plain meaning of [a statutory
provision] by looking to its legislative history.""' 5
There is no doubt that the legislative history of COBRA mentions
many times that the purpose of COBRA is to prevent economic
patient dumping.'1 6 The DeBerry court, however, is equally correct
in its assertion that the plain language of the Act never mentions
the economic condition of the patient. Obviously, the opinion of
the DeBerry court has the potential of greatly increasing the number
of patients who can seek the protection of COBRA. The complaint
in DeBerry alleged that the patient was dumped simply due to an
improper diagnosis. Such a claim sounds strikingly similar to a tra-
ditional state medical malpractice claim. It is unlikely that any of
the sponsors of the Act envisioned that COBRA would be inter-
preted as broadly as the court in DeBerry has interpreted it. This
111. Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433, 436 (D. Kan. 1990).
112. No. 90-C-1173 (N.D. II. 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750 (1990)).
116. See supra note 1.
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is a glaring conflict among the district courts. Until the conflict is
resolved, other courts will have to choose whether they accept the
reasoning of Evitt and Stewart or choose to follow the DeBerry
court.
8. When Hospitals May Cease Treatment Under COBRA
One recent case which highlights another problem of interpreting
COBRA is Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp.117 This case sets
the upper limit on how far treatment of indigents must be taken by
a hospital that receives them. Can a hospital discharge patients after
no major danger to the patient exists, or must they nurture them
to recovery? These issues were examined carefully in Thornton. The
facts of the case involve an elderly woman who was transferred
because of a stroke from her nursing home to the emergency room
of the defendant. The hospital provided intensive care treatment and
eleven full days of inpatient care. Following this care, the hospital
attempted to transfer her to the Detroit Rehabilitation Institute, but
the Institute refused to accept her because she was not able to pay
for services. Subsequently, the defendant hospital released her for
in-home care." 8
Initially, the court, sua sponte, reaffirmed federal subject matter
jurisdiction. It was decided that jurisdiction did exist and that this
jurisdiction was founded on the resolution of a federal question.119
The court also made it clear that any claim under the Act must
show that the plaintiff had an emergency medical condition and that
the plaintiff was transferred before being stabilized.'2
The court then decided that there was no doubt that the plaintiff
had an emergency medical condition prior to being admitted to the
hospital. "The key question is whether the Hospital violated the Act
by releasing Elease Thornton before her condition 'stabilized.' '12 1
The court held that ample evidence showed that the hospital fulfilled
117. 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1133.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1134.
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its requirements under the Act.122 The court based its reasoning on
the fact that Congress intended the Act to guarantee only emergency
treatment to indigents. It was not intended to "bring patients to a
complete recovery.' '  Thus, it is apparent from Thornton that it
is not necessary for a hospital to provide long-term care for indi-
gents.
A collateral issue which was discussed briefly in the opinion was
whether COBRA applies to patients who have been previously ad-
mitted by the hospital. The defendant in Thornton had argued that
once admitted, a patient is no longer protected by the Act.'14 The
court rapidly dismissed this argument by stating that "[h] ospitals
may not circumvent the requirements of the Act merely by admitting
an emergency room patient to the hospital, then immediately dis-
charging that patient.' 5
The Thornton case highlights the problem of drawing a line be-
tween emergency care and continuing medical treatment after the
patient is stabilized. Many within the medical community are unsure
about where to draw the line. On the surface, the answer seems
clear enough. COBRA defines the term "stabilize."' ' 6 It would seem
that hospitals would only need to follow the provisions of the law
in order to avoid liability. In practice, though, the process requires
some line drawing. In any transfer of an emergency patient there
is risk. The problem is how much risk is acceptable. Even a stabilized
122. Id. at 1135.
123. Id. at 1134.
124. Id. at 1135.
125. Id.
126. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395dd(e)(4)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1990). This section provides:
(3)(A) The term "to stabilize" means, with respect to an emergency medical condition
described in paragraph (1)(A), to provide such medical treatment of the condition as may
be necessary to assure, within reasonable medical probability, that no material deterioration
of the condition is likely to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from
a facility, or, with respect to an emergency medical condition described in paragraph (1)(B),
to deliver (including the placenta).
(B) The term "stabilized" means, with respect to an emergency medical condition described
in paragraph (1)(A), that no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within rea-
sonable medical probability, to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual
from a facility, or, with respect to an emergency medical condition described in paragraph
(1)(B), that the woman has delivered (including the placenta).
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patient is at some risk. COBRA provides that an emergency patient
may be transferred only when an informed request for transfer is
made by the patient, when the medical benefits of the transfer out-
weigh the risks, or when the patient is stabilized. A patient is stable
when there is a "reasonable medical probability, that no significant
deterioration is likely to result from the transfer." 127 A resolution
of the question of what is reasonable will require the use of expert
witnesses and will closely resemble a common law suit in negligence.
Some courts, however, have already indicated a willingness to
interpret COBRA as imposing strict liability.'2 Under those rulings,
any economic transfer resulting in damages may lead to liability. A
majority of the courts which have decided cases under the Act have
not followed such a strict liability approach. The trend seems to be
that the statute provides the duty, and the violation of this duty
must be proven by the complainant. Overall, though, the issue of
just when a violation occurs will depend on the facts of each case.
In the meantime, physicians and hospitals are warned to take notice
of this ambiguity and should attempt to err on the side of certainty.
Risky economic transfers are likely to lead to liability.
C. Government Enforcement of COBRA
As the previous section of this note demonstrates, individuals are
gradually becoming aware of their rights under COBRA and are
exercising these rights in ever-increasing numbers. A concurrent
question is whether the federal government is doing its part to see
that indigent patients are not being dumped.
The evidence shows that the government is making substantial
progress in enforcing the Act. The Health Care Financing Admin-
istration (HCFA) of the Department of Health and Human Services
has the "primary responsibility for enforcing the ... provisions."1 29
No specific regulations regarding enforcement of the Act were pro-
127. Schneider, Federal Anti-Dumping Law Hospital and Physician Responsibility, 85 Tnx. MED.
58, 59 (1989).
128. Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Hospital, 709 F. Supp. at 855.
129. Uzych, supra note 6, at 99.
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posed by HCFA until June of 1988.130 There was an initial hesitation
on the part of the HCFA to enforce the law. This, however, changed
after Congress demanded appropriate action.13' Prior to regulations
being enacted, the HCFA had investigated 177 complaints and found
53 hospitals in violation. 32 As a result of the violations, the HCFA
"suspended two Texas hospitals from the Medicare Program and
levied more than $115,000 in fines for patient dumping.' 33 By the
fourth quarter of 1989, the amount of fines levied had reached
$272,999.134
These statistics make it clear that the HCFA has begun to have
an impact on patient dumping. Obviously, the HCFA has powerful
tools to work with, including the ability to strip a hospital of its
Medicare provider agreement. 135 This would spell almost certain death
for many hospitals that rely on Medicare funds for a substantial
portion of their resources. This penalty is used very sparingly. Most
cases of violation generally result in a fine. More often than not,
this fine is less than the full amount possible under the provisions. 6
Ironically, one regional HCFA office has reported that a ma-
jority of the complaints which lead to investigations do not come
from the patient or family members. A number of the violations
are reported by "ambulance crews, law enforcement officers, and
other medical personnel."' 37 The fact that other medical personnel
reported many of the cases probably stems from their awareness of
the law against dumping. In order to protect such whistle-blowers
130. 53 FED. Ra. 116,22517 (1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. part 489, pt. 1001 and pt.
1003) (proposed June 16, 1988).
131. Berliner, supra note 2, at 1279 (wherein the author makes his conclusion based on the
transcript of House Comm. on Government Operations, Equal Access to Health Care: Patient Dump-
ig, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 149 (1988)).
132. Javurek, COBRA and Interhospital Transfers, 41 S.D.J. MED. 21, 22 (1988).
133. Holthaus, HCFA Eager to Crack Down on Patient Dumping, 62 Hosp. 82 (1988).
134. Telephone interview with Judy Holtz, Office of Public Affairs of the Office of Inspector
General of Health and Human Services (August 9, 1990).
135. Office of Inspector General, Patient Dumping After COBRA: U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Services Response to Complaints, OAI 12-88-00831 (Nov. 1988).
136. See Jones, The Devil or the Sea? Transfer Regulations Create a Dilemma, 85 Tnx. MED.
70, 74 (1989). In the case of Office of Inspector General v. Burditt, the government offered to settle
for $2,000. Dr. Burditt refused and was later fined $20,000. No. C-42, Dept. HHS, Dept. App. Bd.
(July 28, 1989).
137. Schneider, supra note 126, at 60.
[Vol. 93
24
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/5
MEDICAL CARE FOR INDIGENTS
from retaliation by their employers, Congress recently amended CO-
BRA to include what it calls whistle-blower protection:
A participating hospital may not penalize or take adverse action against a phy-
sician because the physician refuses to authorize the transfer of an individual with
an emergency medical condition that has not been stabilized.
38
Unfortunately, this protection, if interpreted literally, does not really
protect whistle-blowers. It only protects physicians who refuse to
violate the Act. In addition, it excludes protection for nurses or
other nonphysician health care officials. Since a large percentage of
complaints come from such people, the law probably ought to be
amended again to provide them with protection.
Hospitals should adopt internal regulations to ensure that they
comply with COBRA. In doing so, they can avoid the fate of other
hospitals that have lost their Medicare provider agreements or phy-
sicians that suddenly find themselves penalized by the federal gov-
ernment.
IV. STATE LAWS ON PATIENT DUMPING
In addition to the protection offered by the federal law, twenty-
one states have passed laws which attempt to regulate the problem
of patient dumping. 13 9 The subject matter and scope of these state
laws differ as widely as the protection afforded by them. It will be
the purpose of this section to briefly review the benefits of such
laws. Such a review may provide a guideline for states that are
considering implementing or amending similar laws. One example
of a state that is presently attempting to deal with the difficult prob-
138. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395dd(i).
139. ALAsKA STAT. § 18.08.086(b) (1986); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317.2 (West Supp.
1990); FLA. STAT. Ar. § 395.0144 (West Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-40 (1984); HAw. REv.
STAT. § 321-232(b) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-1391b (1973); In. Rnv. STAT. ch. 111/2 para. 86 (1969);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2163.400 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1988); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
40:2113.6 (West Supp. 1990); MAss. Am. LAws ch. 111, § 70E(k) (Law Co-op. 1985); 1987 NEv.
STAT. 867; N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-b (West Supp. 1989); OR. REv. STAT. 441.094 (1987);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 449.8 (West Supp. 1990); R.I. Gm. LAws § 23-17-26 (Michie 1989); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-7-260(E) (Law. Co-op. 1988); TEN. CODE ANN. § 68-39-301 (1986), 68-11-701 (1972);
TEX. HEALTH & SArETY CODE § 311.022 (Vernon 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-8-8 (1989); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 146.301 (West 1989); WYo. STAT. § 35-2-115 (1988).
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lem of providing health care to indigents is West Virginia.1 40
A. Why State Laws Are Necessary
COBRA provides an excellent foundation for a solution to the
problem. Some states have passed legislation to supplement the fed-
eral law or to fill the gaps in it.
Eight of the twenty-one states mandating a duty to provide emer-
gency care have passed their laws since COBRA was enacted in
1985.141 Most states have simply passed prohibitions which really
have no substance or enforcement provisions. 42 The sole purpose
of such a law is to let those affected by it see that the state is
concerned with the problem. Such symbolic action by a state leg-
islature is an important function. 43 This action shows a resolve by
the duly elected representatives of the people to take action with
regard to a particular issue.
Other states have taken the opportunity to enact useful laws that
fill the gaps of the federal law. 44 This approach is the most effective
and desirable way to deal with the problem of patient dumping,
because it combines the importance of symbolic action with the ef-
fectiveness of purposeful action.
When the Legislature of the State of West Virginia meets in 1993
to decide how to deal with the problem of providing health care to
its indigent population, in accordance with W. VA. CODE 16-29C-
4,145 it should seize the opportunity to include in its legislation certain
provisions to supplement and support COBRA.
140. W. VA. CODE § 16-29C-4 (1990). This statute appointed a board to study the problem of
uncompensated health care. One specified responsibility of the task force is to study the role of
"public, private and private non-profit sectors in providing health care services to the citizens of this
state." Id. Thus, the impact of section 1395dd should be considered when concluding the respon-
sibilities of the above-mentioned health care sectors.
141. Office of the Inspector General, Patient Dumping After COBRA: Assessing the Incidence
and the Perspectives of Health Care Professionals, OAI 12-88-00830 (1988).
142. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2163.400 (Michie/Bobbs- Merrill Cum. Supp. 1988).
143. Jacob, Dimensions of State Politics 6 (A. Heard, State Legislatures in American Politics,
1966).
144. See, e.g., CAL. H&uTH & SA'aTY CODE § 1317.2, 1317.3(d), 1797.98 (West 1990).
145. The statute requires the members of the task force to submit a final report on uncom-
pensated care to the legislature and the joint committee on government and finance, W. VA. CODE
§ 16-29C-4 (1990).
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B. Gaps in COBRA That Have Led to State Solutions
One immediate problem not addressed by COBRA is funding.
The Act requires all hospitals (public and private) that receive federal
funds to provide emergency care for indigents. No mention of re-
imbursement is made anywhere in COBRA. Without reimbursement,
hospitals may be tempted to sidestep the requirements of the Act
in close cases. When provided with assurances that the funding of
indigent care will be reimbursed, there is a greater tendency to com-
ply. Very few states have enacted laws which provide for funding
of emergency room service for indigents. 146 Obviously, all states have
some sort of funding for indigent care at public facilities. The New
Jersey and California statutes go beyond this by providing private
hospitals a chance to collect for uncompensated care. 147 The Cali-
fornia statute is the most practical of the two. It provides for an
"Emergency Medical Services Fund."" 48 This fund "shall be utilized
to reimburse physicians and hospitals for patients who do not make
payment for emergency medical services." 149 The fund is to be ad-
ministered by each county, and the source of the funds is provided
from a fractional assessment of $2.00 for every $10.00 collected for
"every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed ... by the county for
criminal offenses."' 50 This includes offenses of the Vehicle Code. 151
The California statute also provides for the specific procedure that
physicians and hospitals may use to apply for reimbursement. 152 The
State of West Virginia should adopt a funding program based on
either the New Jersey or California statutes or, in the alternative,
the West Virginia Legislature should make funds available from its
Indigent Care Fund. 153 The latter could be accomplished by amend-
ing the provisions of the Indigent Care Fund. The decision of where
the money will come from will have to be left to the Legislature.
146. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1797.98a (West Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:2H-18.1 (Supp. 1990).
147. Id.
148. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1797.98 (West Supp. 1990).
149. Id. 1797.98a.
150. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1465.
151. Id.
152. CAL. HEAT & SAFmT CODE § 1797.98c (West Supp. 1990)
153. See W. VA. CODE § 16-29C-3 (Supp. 1990).
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Even the California Legislature acknowledges that it is likely that
physicians and hospitals will only recover a portion of their actual
expenses, 154 but a portion is better than no recovery at all.
Another potential gap in the federal law is a lack of criminal
penalties for violation. Five states have decided that the problem is
severe enough to warrant criminal sanctions.1 55 The consensus among
the states imposing criminal sanctions is that a knowing denial of
emergency services to a patient should be classified as a misde-
meanor. To a physician who has an unblemished record, the stigma
of any criminal conviction, even for a misdemeanor, could provide
a strong deterrent. Considering that people have died or been per-
manently injured as a result of patient dumping, a criminal sanction
is appropriate.
The federal law could also use some bolstering in the area of
whistle-blower protection. Such protection prevents employer re-
crimination against conscientious health care providers that inform
the appropriate agency when their employers violate the law. COBRA
was recently amended to provide such protection, but the protection,
when read literally, does not solve the problem. 56 In addition, the
protection was not afforded to any employees other than physi-
cians.157 This protection should be afforded to nurses and emergency
medical technicians. In fact, two states have done this by making
the protection available to physicians and other personnel." 8 This
would be an adequate response.
Inadequate record keeping by hospitals of patient transfers has
also hampered federal enforcement of COBRA. COBRA does not
require hospitals to keep records of their transfers or the reasons
for their transfers. The decision concerning records is left up to the
individual hospital administrators. In addition, only a few states
require such records to be kept. An appropriate response to the
154. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1797.98c (West Supp. 1990).
155. See, e.g., Tm. CODE ANN. § 68-39-303 (Supp. 1989).
156. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
157. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395dd(i) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
158. See CAL. HETH & SAFETY CODE § 1317.4(e) (West Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
395.0142(4)(C) (West Supp. 1990).
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problem is offered by the state of Florida. 159 The Florida statute
requires all hospitals to maintain records of transfers. Such a system
will allow both federal and state enforcement agencies to properly
monitor compliance with the law.
The question of attorney's fees was largely ignored by COBRA.
A number of states recently enacted provisions to include the right
to recover attorney's fees.16 Such provisions add some incentive to
lawyers to take the cases of indigents who are the most likely to be
unable to afford legal assistance to recover for their damages. In
a recent federal case, a Texas district court recognized the impor-
tance of reimbursing attorneys for assisting indigents.16' In that case,
a woman was refused treatment during the final stages of her preg-
nancy. 62 After the issuance of a restraining order, enjoining the
hospital from refusing. to deliver the baby, the hospital provided
treatment to the plaintiff.1 63 She and her baby were unharmed, but
the district court granted damages in the amount of $25,000 based
on the negligent infliction of mental anguish. 164 The court also
awarded an additional $25,000 for attorney's fees.1 65
The final noteworthy state law supplement to COBRA is perhaps
the most important. It is a clause prohibiting discrimination in pro-
viding emergency room care. Such a clause should state in clear,
unambiguous language that all hospitals are required to provide
emergency medical care to all persons, with emergency conditions,
who present themselves, "regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, na-
tional origin, citizenship, age, sex, pre-existing medical condition,
physical or mental handicap, insurance status, economic status, or
ability to pay for medical services."'" There is no such discrimi-
nation clause in COBRA. Such statements comprise the entire leg-
159. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0142(4).
160. E.g., 1987 Nnv. STAT. 867.
161. Owens v. Nacogdoches County Hosp., No. L-87-97-CA (E.D. Tx. June 26, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed Library, Dist file).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. CAL. HEALTH & SA y CODE § 1317(b) (West Supp. 1990).
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islation of some of the state laws examined. 67 If a state is truly
concerned with solving the problem, though, such a statement should
only be an introductory provision.
C. A Proposal for West Virginia
Since the Legislature of the State .of West Virgiia is currently
studying its options on how to deal with the problem of providing
health care for indigents, it is appropriate to recommend at this
point a model for possible legislation. Certainly, this model will only
deal with one small portion of the overall problem, namely the pro-
vision of emergency medical care. The previous sections outlined
some of the shortcomings of COBRA that may be solved at the
state level. By including provisions to fill these gaps, West Virginia
will come a long way toward further ensuring that indigents are
provided emergency care.
It seems logical that any attempt to solve a difficult problem
such as this is best handled by using methods that have been tested
and determined to be effective. It would be easy to opt for the
passage of a simple "statement of findings." In order to be truly
effective, legislation must go further to include enforcement pro-
visions.
Based on an analysis of all state laws on the subject, the laws
of one state clearly have set the stage for recent legislation in the
area of "patient dumping." That state is California. This is not
surpr.ising when one considers the fact that of the fifty state leg-
islatures, California was ranked first in effectiveness by the Citizens
Conference on State Legislatures.'" This effectiveness is obviously
reflected in California's approach to patient dumping. In fact, a
substantial portion of the recent amendments to COBRA were a
direct result of the influence of California's legislation. 69
167. E.g., ILL. Ray. STAT. ch. lll'/, para. 86 (1969).
168. Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, State Legislatures: An Evaluation of Their Ef-
fectiveness 40 (1971).
169. See Office of Inspector General, Patient Dumping After COBRA: Assessing the Incidence
and the Perspectives of Health Care Professionals, OAI 12-88-0830, at 3 (1988) The California patient
dumping legislation was included as an appendix to this report. Some of its provisions were enacted
as amendments to COBRA in 1989.
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California's legislation covers each of the demonstrated gaps in
COBRA. One author summed up the potential impact of Califor-
nia's law as follows:
In many ways, COBRA and California anti-dumping legislation complement one
another to maximize the level of protection afforded potential dumping victims.
COBRA provides a baseline point of departure for the safeguards California of-
fers. COBRA provides stabilization, California pays for it .... COBRA grants
patients certain rights, California makes certain the patients know about them.'7 0
Assuming that the Legislature of the State of West Virginia will
agree that the problem of patient dumping needs to be addressed,
and assuming that this is best accomplished by supplementing pre-
existing federal law, it is recommended that the state adopt pro-
visions similar to the California anti-dumping provisions.17 '
V. CONCLUSION
If an individual is turned away from any hospital emergency
room, for economic reasons, that individual will have a cause of
action against the hospital and, arguably, the physician for damages.
Both hospitals and physicians are subject to fines and penalties that
may be imposed by the federal government.
The common law no-duty rule concerning emergency room treat-
ment has been abandoned in its entirety. Where the common law
used to provide refuge for private hospitals, there is no longer pro-
tection. Congress decided that it was intolerable that institutions set
up to help the sick and injured would be able to callously refuse
to treat those who could not pay. As a result, COBRA was passed.
COBRA applies to as many hospitals as Congress had the power
to affect. Any hospital that receives federal funds must comply with
its provisions. That includes virtually all hospitals with emergency
rooms.
COBRA set the standards for emergency room care by requiring
a competent medical screening examination and by setting the re-
170. Beitsch, supra note 5, at 474-75.
171. The following California statutes should be examined: CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1317-
1317.8 & 1797.98a-c (West Supp. 1990).
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quirements which must be adhered to prior to transferring a patient.
COBRA also provides for enforcement by the government and by
an injured individual. The statute's vague language has, however,
left many legal questions for the courts in enforcing the Act. Some
of the most important legal questions have been answered. It is likely
that any court confronted with the subject of patient dumping will
refer to the cases mentioned for guidance and information.
The Health Care Financing Administration has also been doing
its part to ensure that COBRA is followed. As this enforcement
continues, it should place an increasing number of hospitals on no-
tice as to their duty to provide emergency care to all. Eventually,
the enforcement procedures will become set, thus allowing all parties
to understand what their exact duties are.
COBRA is a good law with an admirable purpose. It has pro-
vided a solution for one of the most obvious problems of indigent
care, namely, emergency room treatment. Many have lamented CO-
BRA because it has not gone far enough. The problem of indigent
health care must, however, be solved politically. At this time in
history, COBRA is politically acceptable. COBRA is one step in the
right direction. Once taken, that step cannot be retracted. Accep-
tance of this step is a foundation for another step that can be taken
later. In the meantime, all people now have access to emergency
room treatment.
Some states have recognized shortcomings in COBRA and have
attempted to remedy the problem by enacting statutes to supplement
COBRA. The statutes from the State of California are particularly
noteworthy. The West Virginia Legislature has already evidenced its
concern over the problem of indigent medical care by appointing a
task force to study the problem. It is now time for this task force
to recommend appropriate solutions. One part of this recommen-
dation should include a statute to supplement COBRA.
James P. McHugh
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